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A collective retirement model: identification and estimation in
the presence of externalities∗





We study the labor supply dynamics of elderly couples by means of a structural col-
lective model. The model allows for general externalities with respect to spouses’ leisure.
Preferences and the intrahousehold bargaining process are identified by using panel data
with couples and individuals who turned into widow(er)hood in the covered period. The
model does not only look at the extensive margin (working versus being retired), but also
at the intensive margin (how many hours are worked) and the claiming decision for social
security benefits. We apply the model to American households coming from the first five
waves of the Health and Retirement Study. We also provide model simulations for two
widely discussed reform proposals; more specifically the abolition of the earnings test and
the elimination of the spouse benefit. The model simulations reveal only small changes in
labor supply of elderly couples.
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For obvious reasons, considerable attention has been devoted to the economics of retirement.
Most industrialized countries were subject to sweeping changes of the labor market during
the last decades. Workers retire at younger ages than they used to do, which is coupled to an
increasing life expectancy. At the same time, female labor force participation has increased over
time, resulting in a shrinking gap between male and female participation rates. These labor
market features have their well-known consequences on the social security system (see Gruber
and Wise, 1999, and Social Security Administration, 2003, for some background figures).
The bulk of the studies on the economics of retirement concentrated on retirement decisions
of older men (see, e.g., Gustman and Steinmeier, 1986, Stock and Wise, 1990, and Rust and
Phelan, 1997). Only relatively recently, and following the increased labor force participation
of women, attention shifted towards the issue of labor supply behavior of both spouses in
elderly couples. Characteristic of couples’ labor supply behavior are the coordinated retirement
decisions taken. Indeed, the tendency of husbands and wives to retire together, or very shortly
after each other, are well documented (see, e.g., Blau, 1998, Gustman and Steinmeier, 2000,
2002, 2004; Maestas, 2001; and Michaud, 2003). Complementarities in spouses’ leisure are a
likely explanation for such retirement patterns.
Several models describing joint labor supply dynamics of the elderly have been presented.
Blau (1998) proposes a model where the household utility function depends on both the hus-
band’s and wife’s labor supply status; households are thus assumed to behave as single decision
makers. One major problem with this so-called unitary approach is that there is much empirical
evidence that it does not fit the data very well. Slutsky symmetry and negativity are regularly
rejected when confronted with consumption or labor supply data (see Fortin and Lacroix, 1997,
Browning and Chiappori, 1998, and Vermeulen, 2004, for some recent examples). Evidence
suggests that intra-household bargaining aspects within multi-person households cannot be
ignored in general. Gustman and Steinmeier (2000, 2002, 2004) explicitly take into account
that older couples are composed of two individuals with own preferences. Household decisions,
then, result from a non-cooperative Nash bargaining approach. However, this approach is
somewhat controversial since it can lead to equilibrium outcomes that are not Pareto efficient.
The question can be asked why spouses would not choose those outcomes that make at least
one of them better off without decreasing the welfare level of the other one; especially if one
takes into account that spouses in older couples probably know each other’s preferences very
well, while they are in the repeated game of living in a couple. Another well-known problem
occurs when one considers bivariate simultaneous response models which represent equilibria
in multi-person discrete games where one allows for externalities; elderly couples’ retirement
behavior may serve as a typical example. The presence of multiple equilibria implies an in-
complete econometric model since nonunique outcomes are predicted for given values of the
model’s observables and unobservables (see, e.g., Tamer, 2003). This problem is usually solved
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by introducing ad-hoc rules that change the outcome space of the model (see Gustman and
Steinmeier, 2000, 2002, 2004). Models based on the unitary approach or on cooperative behav-
ior circumvent this incompleteness problem; well-defined household utility functions associate
one, and only one, outcome with a given set of observables and unobservables. Mastrogiacomo,
Alessie and Lindeboom (2002) consider a cooperative, and thus complete, retirement model.
However, their model is essentially equivalent to models where households act as single decision
makers.1
We present a structural retirement model that is embedded in the collective approach to
household behavior (see, Chiappori, 1988, 1992, for seminal contributions, and Vermeulen,
2002, for an introduction to the approach). More specifically, we assume that spouses in older
couples have own preferences over their labor supply and household consumption. Contrary
to Gustman and Steinmeier (2000, 2002, 2004), we assume that the household members are
involved in a bargaining process that results in Pareto efficient outcomes. Especially for older
couples, this assumption seems highly plausible. The assumption has a considerable empirical
content too since recent studies have demonstrated that the collective approach turns out to
be a valuable alternative to describe household behavior (see Browning and Chiappori, 1998,
Chiappori et al., 2002, Cherchye and Vermeulen, 2003, and Vermeulen, 2004).
One important shortcoming of most of the empirical studies within the collective approach
is that rather restrictive individual preferences are assumed. More specifically, preferences
are usually of the egoistic or the caring type (see Chiappori, 1988 for formal definitions).
Basically, these types of preferences imply that an individual’s marginal rate of substitution
between own leisure and consumption remains unaffected by his or her spouse’s labor supply.
Thanks to this assumption, both the sharing rule, which governs how a household’s means
are allocated to the household members, and the individuals’ preferences can be identified
from labor supply data on couples alone.2 As soon as more general preference structures are
considered, additional assumptions must be introduced to obtain identification (see Chiappori
and Ekeland, 2002). Vermeulen et al. (2003) consider a collective model with externalities
going beyond those defined by caring preferences. Identification is obtained by assuming that
some aspects of individual preferences are the same across singles and couples. The model is
applied to cross-sectional data and involves a rather ad-hoc calibration stage.
We present a novel approach to obtain identification in the presence of general external-
ities. This is realized by making use of panel data, coming from the Health and Retirement
1Unitary models are characterized by household utility functions that do not depend on prices (in casu
wages). The utility function in Mastrogiacomo et al. (2002) is a weighted average of the utility functions of
the individuals in a couple. The weights, however, are fixed; implying that their model cannot be distinguished
from a unitary model (see Kooreman and Kapteyn, 1990, and Browning and Chiappori, 1998).
2To be more precise, if individuals’ preferences are egoistic or caring, then the sharing rule can be identified
up to an additive constant, while preferences can be identified up to a translation by means of observed labor
supply behavior of couples.
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Study (HRS), with both couples and individuals who turned into widow(er)hood during the
covered period, in connection with the assumption that preferences do not change, except for
possible health shocks, in such an event. We believe that our identification method is much
less controversial than assuming that preferences across all types of singles and individuals in
couples are the same.
Since we will use our model to conduct simulations of the widely discussed social security
reform proposals to eliminate the spouse allowance and the earnings test, it must be able
to deal with some specific features on top of allowing for externalities in spouses’ leisure.
Firstly, a distinction must be made between work and the claiming decision for social security
benefits. As has been argued by Rust et al. (2001) and Coile et al. (2003), it may be optimal
for individuals to delay claiming and have future benefits increased through the actuarial
adjustment. This of course implies some forward-looking behavior by individuals (see also
Lazear, 1986 and Gruber and Wise, 2002). Secondly, a proper assessment of the incentives
of such institutions as the earnings test and earnings replacement for social security benefits
seems only possible if one does not only focus on the extensive margin (working versus being
retired), but also on the intensive margin (how many hours are worked). Finally, it is clear that
health issues, together with the possible dependence on past choices, may play an important
role in the labor supply decisions of the elderly. All these features are given ample attention
in our model.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we present the collective model
that focuses on labor supply behavior of elderly couples. Section 3 describes and illustrates
some important features of the data. Empirical results are given in Section 4. In Section 5, we
discuss some simulations of social security reforms by means of the structural model. Section 6
concludes.
2 A collective structural model
2.1 Theoretical model
We focus on households that consist of two elderly individuals m and f . In what follows, we
assume that all consumption in the household is public. We further assume that preferences
of each member allow for externalities of the spouse’s leisure. Preferences of individual j





where ljit denotes the amount of leisure of individual j in household i (i=1,...,I) at time t
(t = 1,...,T ). The Hicksian public consumption of household i at time t is denoted by cit.
Both household members are involved in a bargaining process that determines the observed
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allocations over leisure and consumption. Following Chiappori (1988, 1992), we assume that
this bargaining process results in Pareto efficient allocations. The question can be asked,
however, whether household members can commit in the first period to all future allocations,
or whether they can only commit to an allocation of resources for the current period (see
Mazzocco, 2001). In this paper, we assume that the second case applies: optimal household
allocations depend on the bargaining power of the household members in each period, rather
than on some lifetime bargaining power.
As usual in the collective setting, observed allocations are assumed to result from the
maximization of a weighted linear social welfare function, subject to the household’s budget
constraint. Before we formally describe this maximization problem, a few important remarks
are to be made. Firstly, optimal choices do not only depend on the hours choices of the
individuals, but also on their decision to claim social security benefits when they become
eligible (see, Rust et al., 2001 and Coile et al., 2003). This claiming decision has an immediate
impact on the budget set of eligible individuals since it determines whether or not they will start
collecting benefits. It has an additional impact on the budget set through the earnings test,
which applies only if an individual collects social security benefits while working.3 Household
consumption is no real choice variable here, since it is entirely defined by the chosen labor
supply and the claiming decision (assuming nonsatiated preferences). In what follows, we will
denote the claiming decision by means of the dummy variable rjit (j = m,f) which indicates
whether individual j claimed (rjit = 1) or did not claim social security benefits (r
j
it = 0) at time
t. A second important remark is that we take into account that the true wage compensation
of an individual not only depends on the observed wage rate, but also on the accrual in social
security wealth or the implicit social security tax (see, Lazear, 1986 and Gruber and Wise,
2002). Essentially, this implies that by working an additional year without claiming, the
current budget set is affected by forgoing benefits, while it simultaneously affects (possibly
in a negative way) future payments as captured by the net present value of promised social
security benefits. In order to deal with these forward looking aspects in our static model, we
will calculate the labor income part of the household budget set on the basis of the true wage
compensation. Couples where spouses are faced with positive accruals thus have an expanded
budget in comparison to the budget set which would have been obtained by restricting attention
to observed wages. Let us denote observed gross wage rates by wj∗it (j = m,f). The true wage
rate wjit used to calculate the labor income is related to the observed wage in the following
way:
wjit = (1 + a
j
it) · wj∗it (j = m, f) ,







, with Et the expectations
operator (with respect to uncertain life-time) and St the time-dependent present value of social
3Note that we do not take into account that benefit losses due to the earnings test are paid at a later age
when earnings are below the threshold in our myopic model (see also Appendix A).
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security wealth, which is affected by the claiming status and individual leisure.4












it, cit) + (1− µit)vf (lmit , lfit, cit) (2)
subject to














where pt is the price of the public good. The tax function F accounts for the federal income
taxes as well as social security contributions to compute the net full income Mit. The com-
ponents that enter gross income are the individuals’ true wage rates, non-labor income yit
and labor supply hjit = T − ljit, j = m, f , where T is the individual’s time endowment.5 The
function bt captures social security benefits (Old Age Social Insurance, OASI), which depend,
among others, on both spouses’ labor market status and their observed wages through the
social security earnings test. Appendix A gives the full details of the computation of the social
security benefits available to the household as well as the tax schedule F . A detailed account
of social security rules is made while a more simplified tax schedule is applied for the federal
income tax. Note that the choice variables in the above maximization problem belong to the
set B(rmit−1, r
f
it−1, t). This set combines all possible leisure choices with the claiming decision
outcomes. Since an individual is only allowed to claim at the age of 62, this set depends on
time t. Moreover, once an individual claimed, he or she cannot undo this decision in the fu-
ture. In other words, the choice set gets restricted once an individual decided to start collecting
benefits (i.e., the only remaining choice are the hours worked). Therefore, the choice set also
depends on the past claiming status rjit−1 (j = m,f).
As can be seen from (2), male and female utilities are weighted by respectively µit and
(1− µit). We assume that these weights depend on real wages, non-labor income and other
4A few remarks can be made with respect to the accrual in social security wealth. Firstly, the effect of hours
worked on the implicit social security tax is individual specific. E.g., if there is wage replacement for some
individual (see Appendix; calculation of Average Indexed Monthly Earnings), then the effect of hours on the
accrual will be positive. If the earnings test comes into play, however, then hours worked negatively affect the
accrual. Secondly, we consider the accrual in each year where a decision is taken. In the option value model of
Stock and Wise (1990), the maximum gain from postponing retirement versus retiring now is focused on. This
gain is found by comparing the present values of retiring at each future age versus retiring in the current period.
If these present values monotonously vary over time, then the accrual is sufficient to model retirement delay.
Note finally, that the accruals are generally small for the sample that we selected.
5Many individuals receive a lump sum of private pension benefits when they retire. In order to avoid a
bias by taking up this usually large lump sum in the non-labor income yit, we opted to annuitize it such that
individuals spread these large pensions over their remaining life years (where life expectancy is set equal to 100).
This choice is also supported by Hurd et al. (1998), who show that less than one fifth of the HRS respondents
who have private pension rights cash out their entitlements. Moreover, these cashed-out plans only account for
about 6% of all plan dollars involved.
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earnings or pension history characteristics influencing the form of the budget set and therefore
potentially influencing the individuals’ bargaining position within the household. Moreover,
welfare weights may also depend on so-called ‘distribution factors’, which influence individuals’
bargaining positions but do not affect their preferences or the household’s budget set (see
Chiappori, Fortin and Lacroix, 2002). As a consequence, we have µit = µ(pit), where pit
is a vector of, say, ‘bargaining factors’ containing real wages, budget set characteristics and
distribution factors. If µit is increasing in w
m
it , e.g., then the husband’s bargaining position
improves, following an increase in his true wage.6 This implies that he will be able to claim
a higher utility than before, which is produced by an intrahousehold allocation that is more
favorable to the husband. Because altruism is allowed, this does not necessarily imply that the
husband will work less, while the wife will work more than before. Worthy of note is that this
model implies a deviation from the traditional unitary model, since the household’s ‘utility
function’ now depends on current wages and non-labor income.
A well-known problem of the above general setting with public goods and externalities,
however, is that the model is not identified without additional assumptions, even by making
use of bargaining factors in the weights (see Bourguignon and Chiappori, 1994, and Chiappori
and Ekeland, 2002). The problem is essentially that if marginal utilities are strictly positive for
all goods, then there exists a continuum of utility functions and welfare weights that yield the
same observed choices. Chiappori and Ekeland (2002) propose restrictions on these marginal
utilities to secure identification. They propose to use goods where consumption can be assumed
to be exclusive (e.g., males’ and females’ clothes).
In our context this is not applicable, so we must rely on some other solution. Therefore,
in what follows, we will assume that singles, and more specifically widows and widowers, have
the same preferences as individuals in couples who have the same sex, and who have similar
other personal characteristics like health status. This allows identifying both preferences, as
captured by the utility functions vj, and welfare weights µit and (1− µit). In the next section,
we show that these restrictions are similar in spirit to conditions imposed in Chiappori and
Ekeland (2002). Essentially, we restrict the marginal utility of the partner’s leisure to be zero
when that spouse dies.
At first sight, this may appear as a strong assumption. However, if one believes that
preferences are individual-specific, as is explicitly the case in the collective approach, then it
can be argued that preferences can only change via a clear channel following the death of
one’s partner. An obvious candidate for such a channel is health status that we can control
for by modelling heterogeneity in preferences that may change over time. Since it can be
argued that widow(er)hood is an exogenous shock to a household (conditional on a set of
6The assumed dependence of these weights on current real wages is rather innocuous: it simply implies that
the bargaining power of an individual remains unchanged, if all current prices and wages are multiplied by a
common factor. As a consequence, observed behavior is not affected by the unit in which monetary variables
are expressed.
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observables such as age and prior health), the assumption of equality of preferences is much
more innocent then assuming that all singles would have the same preferences as individuals
in couples, irrespective of the fact that they were never married, were divorced or turned into
widow(er)hood. Notwithstanding this identification assumption, several sources for differences
in behavior between widow(er)s and individuals in couples are allowed. Firstly, widow(er)hood
may be followed by a health shock that on its turn may influence preferences. Secondly,
opportunity sets can be very different over household types; a fact that is even corroborated
by all goods being publicly consumed. Thirdly, in our empirical model, singles’ utility functions
are conditional on the amount of leisure of the individual of the other sex being equal to the
amount corresponding to full-time working hours. For couples, this implicitly implies that
living in a couple does not generate utility in its own (apart from a higher income that is
publicly consumed). Additional utility of living in a couple compared to being single is, ceteris
paribus, only created if a spouse is retired or working part-time. These three features may give
rise to quite different labor supply choices of widow(er)s and individuals in couples. We will
show below that the panel data at hand is very well-suited to pursue the above identification
strategy.
2.2 Empirical model
2.2.1 Individual and collective household utility functions
Let us now turn to the empirical strategy to apply the above structural model. Specific to
this strategy is that it is embedded in a discrete choice framework. This approach assumes
that individuals have the choice between only a limited number of labor supply options. The
advantage of the approach is that it can easily deal with complex non-linear and non-convex
tax schemes; a feature certainly applicable to the social security benefits system.
Assuming that both spouses are confronted with the same choices, let us denote the discrete
set of leisure choices by L = {lp; p = 1, ..., P}. Possible leisure choices lp are equal to E − hp,
were E is an individual’s weekly total time endowment and hp are weekly working hours.
Following van Soest (1995), these working hours are multiples of a fixed interval length IL =
hP
P−1 ; hP being the maximum possible working hours. Hours choices hp are thus equal to
(p− 1) IL, p = 1, ..., P . In the empirical exercise, the number of working hours choices P is set
equal to 4, while hP is equal to 60 hours. This results in working hours choices that range from
0 to 60 hours, in multiples of 20 hours. Leisure choices are finally obtained by subtracting these
working hours from E, which, taking account of time needed to sleep and other maintenance
tasks, is set equal to 80. As already discussed before, the set L is only part of the total state
space: individuals also have to choose whether or not they will delay claiming social security
benefits.
With discrete choice labor supply in a collective setting, one of the main concerns will
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be to postulate individual utility functions which impose coherency through concavity, and
further will allow for taste variation in all possible states. Allowing for externalities is also
of crucial importance. Therefore, we assume that individuals’ preferences are of a modified
Cobb-Douglas type and are represented by the direct utility function (j = m, f):
vj(lmit , l
f

















These utility functions depend on the spouse’s leisure in two ways. First, the spouse’s leisure
enters in a strongly separable fashion through βj−j not affecting marginal tradeoffs between
own leisure and consumption. Second, it enters into the marginal utility of own leisure through
βjmf . This second effect is very similar to that considered in Gustman and Steinmeier (2000,
2002, 2004). We would expect a positive coefficient βjmf if marginal utility of leisure increases
with leisure of the spouse.
Restricting coherency conditions to own choice variables, utility functions are well-behaved
if marginal utilities with respect to own consumption and leisure are positive. Note that the
household consumption cit depends on both spouses’ leisure and on their claiming decision.

















it−1 = lp), (5)
where we assume that αi = (αmi , α
f
i )
0 is distributed according to a bivariate normal distribution
in the population with covariance matrix Ωα : (σαjk) for j, k = m,f . We thus assume that the
above coefficients are linear functions of observed demographic variables like age and health
indicators; all included in the vectors xj−j,it and x
j
j,it. The utility parameter associated with
own leisure is also dependent on some unobserved heterogeneity αji that may influence joint
labor supply decisions, and the past labor supply choice as captured by the indicator functions
I (.). It should be remarked that this specific heterogeneity structure can be interpreted both
as dynamic behavior through preferences depending on past choices and as hours restrictions
due to, for example, fixed costs to participation. In our rather myopic collective model, these
factors only shape current preferences and do not influence future intrahousehold allocations
(see also Lazear, 1986, and Hurd, 1996). We also mirror the heterogeneity structure present
in the leisure coefficient βjj for the coefficient β
j
c without allowing for a lagged effect of past
leisure decisions. Since a positive marginal utility in consumption is crucial we restrict it a
priori to be positive.
Since the individual welfare weights, µit, have to be between zero and one, we opt for the
following functional specification:
µit = µ(pit) =
exp (p0itµ)
1 + exp (p0itµ)
. (6)
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In the empirical exercise, the vector of bargaining factors pit includes hourly wages, non-
labor income and variables such as the average indexed monthly wage directly linked with the
calculation of social security benefits. It is expected that all these variables may influence an
individual’s bargaining position in the household. The non-labor income will be effectively
capital income. The wages considered will be imputed wages that depend implicitly on health,
tenure, age and other covariates. We will also include the age difference between spouses in
the specification of the weight.
2.2.2 Identification of preference parameters and welfare weights
As already mentioned, the above collective model with public goods and externalities cannot
be identified on couples’ data alone. To illustrate the problem, consider the following collec-
tive household utility function that is the weighted average of the individual utility functions
vj(lmit , l
f
it, cit) (j = m,f) of equation (3) with appropriate weights:

















+ (1− µ (pit)) (βfm ln lmit + βff ln lfit + βfc ln cit + βfmf ln lmit ln lfit).
To make the exposition easier, let us assume that the weights are linear in the set of bargaining
factors: µ (pit) = µ0pit. Next, given the above specification for the household utility function,
we get the following restrictions from which to identify the parameters from couples alone:
ηm (pit) = µ (pit)β
m
m + (1− µ (pit))βfm, ηf (pit) = µ (pit)βmf + (1− µ (pit))βff ,
ηc (pit) = µ (pit)β
m
c + (1− µ (pit))βfc , ηmf (pit) = µ (pit)βmmf + (1− µ (pit))βfmf . (7)
One will note that there are P restrictions per ηj (pit) (j = m, f, c,mf ; P = dim(pit)
including a constant) given the interactions between each of the elements of pit and the utility
components. Therefore, there are 4P restrictions in total. The number of structural parameters
defining preferences and weights equals P+ 8. Hence, it appears that the model is identified
based on the order condition for P > 2. This is the case as soon as two elements in pit are
added on top of a constant, which is essentially the result shown in Kooreman and Kapteyn
(1990). However, we can show in this general context that the rank condition fails to be
satisfied.
Consider, for example, the following transformed individual utility functions and welfare
weights (compare to Chiappori and Ekeland, 2002):
vf∗(lmit , l
f
it, cit) = εv
f (lmit , l
f
it, cit) + (1− ε) vm(lmit , lfit, cit),
vm∗(lmit , l
f
it, cit) = (ε− 1) vf (lmit , lfit, cit) + εvm(lmit , lfit, cit),
µ∗ (pit) =
µ (pit)− 1− ε










. It can now easily be checked that the collective
household utility function that is obtained by these transformed utilities and welfare weights
results in the same set of restrictions as in (7). In other words, a continuum of structural
models (defined by different values of ε) give rise to the same reduced-form parameters; and
therefore the same predicted behavior from couples’ data alone.
Key for this non-identification result is that the individual utility functions are strictly in-
creasing in their arguments. Therefore, Chiappori and Ekeland (2002) propose to use exclusive
goods to obtain identification in this case. One needs two goods, each of which is exclusive to
one of the spouses. What we want to show here is that using couples and widow(er)s serves
that purpose without using exclusive goods. To do this, we introduce two dummy variables
kmit and k
f
it. If an observation i at time t consists of a couple, then both dummies are equal to
one. For single men (women), kmit (k
f




it ) is equal to zero. We can now











it; zit)− vf (yit,kmit ; zit)),
where yit = (lmit , l
f
it, cit)
0 and zit captures all other exogenous variables.
For widows the utility function equals:
uh∗ (yit,0, 1,pit; zit) = v







with ∂vf/∂lmit = 0. For widowers, we have:
uh∗ (yit,1, 0,pit; zit) = v







in which case ∂vm/∂lfit = 0.
Finally, for couples we have
uh∗ (yit,1, 1,pit; zit) = µ(pit)v
m (yit, 1; zit) + (1− µ(pit))vf (yit, 1; zit)
= ηm(pit) ln l
m
it + ηf (pit) ln l
f





From widows and widowers, 4 parameters can be estimated for as many structural parame-
ters. Using these parameters in the four sets of restrictions for couples, enables to separately
identify weights from preference parameters. This is because there are 4 remaining preference
parameters and P weight parameters, while there are 4P parameters that can be estimated.
2.2.3 Estimation
Since we assumed away savings, and depending on the number of labor supply choices for
both individuals (denoted by P ) and whether or not individuals already claimed, there are
maximum P 2 × 4 possible values of the decision variables for married couples. They involve
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all combinations of both individuals’ labor supply and their claiming decision (if they have not
claimed yet; cf. supra). Since the budget constraint is potentially non-convex and choices are
discrete we need to evaluate utility at maximum P 2 × 4 points




it,kit,pit; zit) + εsit
where kit = (kmit , k
f
it)
0 and ysit ∈ B(rmit−1, rfit−1, t). We add some measurement or optimization
error term for each alternative assumed to be independent and identically distributed across
alternatives with type 1 extreme value distribution (GEV(1)). Note that for singles only
maximum P × 2 states are observed. Since we model the budget set carefully we will be able
to take account of survivor benefits and changes in non-labor income following the death of
the spouse. Therefore, we allow for a structural shift through the budget set but not directly
through the utility function, which remains the same after the death of one’s partner (if no
health shocks are present).








0, household types ki = (k0i1, ...,k
0
iT )
0, a specific value for αi and some initial





which follows from the time-independence assumption on εsit. If the εsit follow a GEV(1)
distribution, then we have the familiar conditional logit formulation





where dsit is an indicator variable that equals 1 if choice y
s
it ∈ B(rmit−1, rfit−1, t) is observed and
s0 denotes the available choices.
For a well-defined likelihood we need to take the expectation of this probability with respect
to the joint probability distribution of the unobserved heterogeneity and the initial condition
y∗i,0. One cannot plausibly assume that αi is independent of y
∗
i,0 such that we need to specify
further our parametric model (Heckman, 1981). In the present context, Wooldridge (2002)
suggested that postulating a conditional distribution for Pr(y∗i,0|αi) is not less restrictive than
imposing one for Pr(αi|y∗i,0). Therefore we make the assumption that αi arises from a linear







0 with hsji0 being the initial health
status of spouse j : π0jy
j∗
i,0 . Due to the conditioning on initial health, any remaining effect
from other health variables will not come from the correlation in time-invariant unobservables
that affect health and labor supply over the life-cycle (see Michaud and van Soest, 2004).
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For the estimation, we use maximum simulated likelihood. We have the following likelihood












Pr(dsit = 1|zit,kit, eαir,y∗i,0;θ) (10)
where θ denotes the parameters to estimate.
The estimator is consistent for N and R going to infinity and asymptotically equivalent
to maximum likelihood for R/
√
N tending to infinity (Hajivassiliou et al., 1996). As it turns
out in the empirical exercise, conditioning on initial hours choices and initial health in the
coefficient associated to own leisure is enough to capture the latent correlation across periods
in choices (i.e., the variances of unobserved heterogeneity go to zero). Note that this does
not imply that unobserved heterogeneity is not present. It is shown in Wooldridge (2002),
though, that if it is present, then conditioning on initial choices provides consistent estimates.
Naturally, this greatly simplifies the computation problem and therefore we do not need to
conduct Monte Carlo integration for each sequence of decisions.
3 Data
We apply our model to data that are drawn from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS).
The HRS is sponsored by the National Institute on Aging and conducted by the University
of Michigan. It consists of a longitudinal study following a cohort of individuals who were
born between 1931 and 1941 (both years included), and their spouses if married (regardless of
age). The HRS is extremely rich and encompasses lots of socio-economic information like the
respondents’ demographic background, employment status, job history, income sources, health
status, wealth and pension plans. Moreover, the HRS includes a linkage with administrative
data of the Social Security Administration which provides respondents’ earnings histories from
1950 to 1991, allowing an accurate calculation of the Old Age Social Insurance benefits. We use
the public release (version C) of the HRS from the RAND Corporation (StClair et al., 2002),
which merges respondents from the five available biennial waves covering the period between
1992 and 2000. These data are complemented with the SSA files and the employer-provided
pension information.
The sample selection is for married or cohabiting couples where both individuals were alive
in 1992. For identification reasons explained earlier, these initial couples remain in the dataset
for the five waves, irrespective of the fact that some individuals turn to widow(er)hood in the
given time span. After deleting observations with important missing information, we have a
sample of 2,495 households that are observed in five consecutive periods.7
7Since we need accurately calculated OASI benefits, the sample selection was for respondents who gave
permission to link their earnings histories as reported to the Social Security Administration to the HRS. Earnings
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Table 1 reports, across all-waves, the numbers of complete couples, widows and widowers
along with summary statistics of key variables in the analysis. As is clear from the table, and
according to common knowledge, more widows than widowers are observed as time proceeds.
Widows and widowers are generally in worse health than their counterparts in couples. This
may reflect some correlation with their lost spouse’s health (see Michaud and van Soest, 2004),
but may also be due to the fact that individuals in couples are older on average than widow(er)s.
Note that about 7 to 10% of the spouses experienced a severe health onset (e.g., cancer, a heart
condition or a stroke) during the survey. The table further indicates that about one fifth of the
sample had been subject to a severe health onset before participation to the survey. This is the
case for more than half of the sample as far as mild health onsets (e.g., diabetes, arthritis or
mental problems) are concerned. Focusing on labor supply, it turns out that widowers work less
than males in couples, which is the case for both the extensive and the intensive margin. For
widows, this is only the case with respect to the choice between working or not working. The
table also indicates that widow(er)s generally earn less than individuals in couples, and that
they have lower pension income and social security benefits. On the other hand, substantially
more widow(er)s claimed OASI-benefits. Worthy of note from our model’s point of view is
that about a quarter of the individuals want to retire at the same time as their spouse.
[Table 1 about here]
Many features of the HRS data with respect to retirement behavior have already been
thoroughly discussed. Especially the extensive margin (working versus being retired) attracted
much attention in the literature (see, e.g., Coile and Gruber, 2000, Maestas, 2001, Gustman
and Steinmeier, 2002, and Michaud, 2003). Given our model’s set-up, we will focus on both
the extensive and the intensive margin of labor supply behavior of the elderly in what follows;
a feature of the HRS data that has not been widely dealt with. In addition, we pay ample
attention to the claiming decision for social security benefits.
In the top panel of Table 2, ages are shown when individuals started claiming social security
benefits (for the year 2000). It is clear from the table that most spouses start claiming at
the age of 62, which reflects the rather low accruals that one gets by delaying the claim for
benefits. Of course, quite some individuals claim when they are older. Possible reasons may be
earnings replacement, heterogenous preferences or spousal considerations. The bottom panel
of the figure shows the distribution of the difference in claiming age for those who claimed
conditional on the husband’s claiming age. As has already been noticed by Maestas (2001),
more than one third of the claimants do it within one year of each other. Interestingly, this
frequency is highest when the husband claimed at the age of 65. Taking into account an average
histories are available for about 75% of the HRS respondents. According to Haider and Solon (2000), the HRS
Social Security earnings sample is reasonably representative for the original sample.
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age difference of three years, this implies that wives start claiming at the age of 62. A clear
candidate for why this pattern emerges is the spouse allowance.
[Table 2 about here]
Table 3 gives couples’ labor supply choices for each of the four possible combinations of
the spouses’ claiming decision. It is clear from the tables that there are quite important
numbers of households in almost all combinations of hours choices. This indicates that it is
indeed worthwhile to also look at the intensive margin when dealing with retirement behavior.
Further, although the claiming of social security benefits is associated with a higher percentage
of non-participation of the claimants, it is not the case that the latter always quit the labor
market once this decision has been taken: a high number of claimants keep on working. Since
this is mainly part-time, there are indications that the earnings test influences this pattern. It
is also noticeable that the percentages of non-claiming individuals who do not participate or
who work part-time are higher if these non-claimants are married with a claiming spouse. We
also checked possible correlations between the spouses’ labor supply choices across all possible
claiming configurations. A Chi-square test of independence strongly rejects the null hypothesis
of independent choices. A similar exercise has been done with respect to the spouses’ labor
supply transitions. Once again, a Chi-square independence test strongly rejects the hypothesis
that spouses change labor supply independently from each other, which implies that it is worth
considering externalities in leisure when modelling couples’ labor supply behavior.
[Table 3 about here]
In Table 4, we concentrate on the possible correlation between the claiming decision and the
hours of work decision. More specifically, transition matrices for hours of work are computed
for spouses who did not claim in the initial period, compared to those who either claimed or
still have not claimed benefits in the next period. Interestingly, claiming spouses tend to move
from non-participation and full-time work (30-50 hours per week) to part-time work (1-30
hours per week) to a greater extent, than their non-claiming counterparts. For example, of
those husbands who did not claim in the initial period, 25% claimed social security benefits
and went to part-time work in the next period. This is the case for only 6% of those husbands
who did not claim in the next period. For wives, a similar pattern emerges.
[Table 4 about here]
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Let us finally have a look at some budget sets.8 In Figures 1 and 2, we show budget sets
for households with respectively a 67 years old husband and a husband that has age 62 in
2000, and who both are eligible for Old Age Social Insurance. The upper-left panel in each
figure gives the budget set for a household where both spouses have an hourly wage rate that
is equal to the 25th quantile of the male and female wage distributions. This boils down to an
hourly wage of 12.71 USD for males and 9.01 USD for females. We assume that the household
has a non-labor income equal to the 25th quantile of the associated distribution, which is
split between spouses for taxation purposes. Further, the Average Indexed Monthly Wage is
respectively equal to 2430.20 and 654.20 USD for the husband and the wife. The bottom-left
panel of each figure shows a similar budget set where wages and non-labor incomes are equal
to the 75th quantile of the respective distributions. Male and female wages are here equal to
24.74 and 16.65 USD, while the non-labor income equals 14,000 USD. The AIME is equal to
3941.10 USD for the husband and 1818.60 USD for the wife. All left-hand side graphs thus
show how household consumption increases if either the husband or the wife, or both of them,
increase their labor supply.
The two-dimensional right-hand side panels of the figures show the budget set of the hus-
band conditional on the number of hours worked by his wife (i.e., the lowest curve corresponds
to non-participation of the female, while the highest curve is associated with a labor supply of
60 hours).
It is clear from the different panels in Figure 1 that the budget sets are convex and have
everywhere a relatively constant slope for both household types with a 67 year old husband.
Social security and progressive income taxation do not introduce very important non-linearities
(kinks) and non-convexities into the budget set for these households. Another picture emerges
for couples with a husband that has age 62 (Figure 2). Here, the budget set has some pro-
nounced inward kinks and an outward kink that makes the budget set non-convex. Marginal
tax rates are thus higher once the inward kink is passed, while they are decreased at a higher
amount of hours (the exact kink of course differs for low and high earners). The main reason
for the different picture in the two figures is the earnings test that has different consequences
depending on the age of the husband. First of all, the threshold level differs for husbands below
or above the normal retirement age; thus introducing a different inward kink in the budget set.
Further, for the younger household, the earnings test introduces a tax of 50% on the benefits,
once its threshold is passed. The steeper slope at high working hours is due to the fact that
all benefits are taxed away, and the usual marginal income tax rate applies. Benefits of the
household with a husband of 67 years old are only taxed at 33%. This rate is closer to the
marginal income tax rate of the bulk of the households, which explains the hyperplane-like
budget set.
To conclude, it is clear that incentives are highly different for households that differ along
8These budget sets are based on the observed wages and do not take account of accruals.
16
the age and income dimensions. Due to the complexity of our model (each spouse has own
preferences, while there is bargaining within the household), it is rather difficult to make a
priori statements on how these incentives will affect labor supply behavior (compare to Moffitt,
2003). Empirical estimates and simulations will be able to shed light on the issue. Note also
that the budget sets shown illustrate the usefulness of our discrete choice approach, which is
very convenient to deal with non-convexities and non-linearities.
[Figure 1 about here]
[Figure 2 about here]
4 Empirical results
We applied the empirical model described above under the assumption that each spouse has
four labor supply choices. These options range from nonparticipation to working on average
60 hours per week, in steps of 20 hours. Taken together, this implies that each couple is
confronted with 16 labor supply options. Model estimates are shown in Table 5. Once initial
conditions are taken into account, it turns out that no unobserved heterogeneity is left in
individual preferences. Parameter estimates are therefore those with unobserved heterogeneity
parameters αji set equal to zero (j = m,f ; ∀i).
Let us first have a closer look at the preference parameters. Focusing on health, the number
of onsets of severe diseases like cancer, a heart condition or a stroke, seems to have a positive and
significant impact on the parameters βjj (j = m,f), which are associated with a spouse’s own
leisure. Since this variable is insignificantly estimated in the marginal utility of consumption
βjc (j = m, f), one may conclude that severe health onsets have a negative impact on hours
worked, which is of course quite intuitive. Since these onsets appear in several places in the
econometric specification, it may be hard to interpret their impact. Therefore, we calculated
the increase in the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption due to the
parameters associated with a severe onset (see Table 6). It turns out that a severe onset with
respect to the husband is equivalent to having to compensate between 5.17 and 19.9 dollar per
hour more. Since marginal rates of substitution are already quite high, this implies that it is
even less plausible that a husband will keep on working after such an onset. Onsets of mild
diseases like arthritis and diabetes have only a significant impact on male labor supply. This
seems to support the case that one can still work for some time after an onset of a mild disease.
Note, however, that the initial health condition captures a lot of the propensity to get such
disease, implying that its effect may already be captured elsewhere. Restrictions in activities
of daily living (ADLs; bathing, eating, walking across a room, getting in or out of bed, etc.)
influence labor supply behavior of the spouse. Estimated parameters with respect to ADLs
have an opposite impact on preferences though. According to the associated results in Table 6,
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however, one may conclude that their impact on hours worked is strongly negative. Note that
the huge impact in the 95th percentile can be explained by the linear effect of restrictions in
ADLs. If someone has a partner who cannot get out of bed alone, cannot eat alone, etc., then
this surely has its consequences on his or her labor supply. Note that since we conditioned
on initial health, it can be argued that health has a causal effect on hours worked (see also
Michaud and van Soest, 2004). Taken as a whole, the effect of the different health indicators
on preferences accords with intuition: a bad health has a negative impact on labor supply.
Since several measures have a significant and different impact on spouses’ labor supply, the
results illustrate that health is multidimensional and that different measures have their place
in a labor supply model.
A second group of variables that have an important and significant impact on preferences
are the dummies indicating howmany hours an individual worked in the last period. The results
indicate that, ceteris paribus, a higher number of hours worked in the former period results in a
higher labor supply in the current period. As mentioned earlier, this may point to the presence
of habit formation or hours restrictions due to, for example, fixed costs of participation. Also
initial own leisure is significant, which stresses the importance of initial conditions to account
for unobserved preference heterogeneity. Note, however, that the partner’s initial leisure is
not significant. This is probably due to the fact that we already conditioned on the partner’s
restrictions in ADLs: if a partner suffered from such restrictions initially, then it is plausible
that she or he did not work in later periods.
We can also see from Table 5 that there are significant externalities with respect to leisure
in couples. This is the case for both the parameters βjj0 and the parameters β
j
mf (j = m,f).
The impact of a subjective indicator for a preference for shared leisure is in line with results
obtained by Maestas (2001), Gustman and Steinmeier (2002) and Coile (2003). One puzzling
result is obtained when the total marginal effect of spousal leisure is calculated: for men, it is
positive, while there are, on average, (rather small) negative externalities for women.
A major feature of our model is that it is embedded in the collective approach to household
behavior. As the results in the bottom part of Table 5 indicate, this structural aspect cannot
be ignored. First of all, the husband’s wage rate has a positive and highly significant impact on
his utility weight, which itself has consequences on how leisure and consumption is allocated
within the household. Remark that this does not necessarily imply that his leisure will increase
at the cost of decreasing the amount of leisure of his spouse, all other things equal. The
exact allocation of course depends on the valuation of the different commodities in the utility
function. Secondly, and according to intuition, the female’s wage has a negative effect on the
husband’s utility weight; the latter is not significant though. Also the household’s nonlabor
income has a negative and significant impact on the husband’s bargaining weight. Remark that
these results imply a strong rejection of the standard unitary model, which is characterized by
price-independent utility functions. Simulations obtained by means of models not taking into
18
account intrahousehold bargaining aspects should thus be interpreted with care. Also some
specific aspects of the social security system influence a household’s bargaining process. This is
the case for the husband’s AIME, which has a negative impact on his weight. One explanation
for this effect is that if a husband has a high AIME, then his spouse can collect a high spouse
benefit or a divorce benefit whatever the husband does. The returns from the spouse benefit
accrue to her, independently of her participation status, which may increase her bargaining
position.
[Table 5 about here]
[Table 6 about here]
The model’s fit is illustrated in Table 7. The table shows observed and predicted couples’
labor supply frequencies for the year 2000. The predicted frequencies will serve as the baseline
situation in the simulation exercise. It is clear from the table that the number of couples
where both spouses do not participate is well predicted. On the other hand, the cell where
both spouses work on average 40 hours per week is underpredicted. Although a chi-square
goodness-of-fit test rejects the null-hypothesis that the predicted frequencies come from the
same distribution as the observed ones, it is quite satisfactory that the model allocates couples
to all possible choices. This stresses that it is worthwhile focusing on the intensive margin, on
top of the discrete choice between working and not working.
[Table 7 about here]
5 Simulations
5.1 Social security reforms
We now discuss simulation results by means of the above identified model. Several proposals
to increase labor force participation of the elderly have been made by policy makers. In this
section, we discuss two such proposals.
The first simulation that we focus on is the elimination of the spouse benefit or spouse
allowance. According to current Social Security rules, a spouse is entitled to the maximum of
the own benefit and half of the Primary Insurance Amount of the other spouse, given that he
or she is eligible for Old Age Social Insurance benefits, to which own actuarial adjustments
are imposed (see Appendix A). It is clear that this rule may have an impact on labor supply
decisions of the individuals in married couples. Blau (1997), for example, concludes that
the elimination of the spouse allowance and its replacement by a system of earnings sharing
decreases husbands’ participation rates, while there is a positive impact for married women.
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The second proposal is the abolition of the earnings test. Currently, Old Age Social Insur-
ance benefits are reduced if one has a labor income above some threshold if one is younger than
the normal retirement age. Up to 2000, this was also the case for beneficiaries older than the
normal retirement age.9 In order to study possible disincentive effects of this rule, we simulate
the complete removal of the earnings test for both beneficiaries below and above the normal
retirement age. Earlier results in the literature gave a rather diffuse picture of the labor supply
effects of the earnings test. Reimers and Honig (1996), for example, conclude that women are
not affected by the earnings test, while there is some evidence that men are deterred from
working by this rule. Friedberg (2000) comes to similar results for older men. Gruber and
Orszag (2000), on the contrary, claim that there is no robust influence on the labor supply of
men, while there is some evidence that the earnings test has an impact on the labor supply
decisions of women.
5.2 Results
As mentioned when we discussed the model’s fit, predicted frequencies for married couples in
the year 2000 are the baseline situation in the simulation exercise. Starting from this baseline,
we proceed discussing the impact of the social security reforms on hours worked. Changes in
the relative frequencies of couples’ labor supply choices are given in Table 8. As is clear from
the table, the impact of both reforms is rather marginal. Worthy of note with respect to the
abolition of the spouse allowance is that it has a positive impact on female labor supply, which
points to disincentive effects associated with the allowance. This result confirms earlier results
obtained by Blau (1997). The impact of the abolition of the earnings test is relatively more
important than the spouse allowance reform, although its effect must not be overestimated.10
The reform implies a decrease in the relative frequency of couples where both spouses are not
participating. Quite intuitively, this is coupled to an increase in the labor supply of husbands;
although also some wives increase their labor supply after the abolition of the earnings test.
Note that these different changes point out that labor supply dynamics go beyond the choice
between participation and non-participation; also the intensive margin is important. We can
conclude from these simulation results that the abolition of the earnings test has a positive,
though small, impact on the labor supply of men, while the effect on women’s labor supply
is less obvious. These results thus seem to confirm earlier results obtained by Reimers and
9The ‘Senior Citizens Freedom to Work Act’ of 2000 abolished the earnings test for those over the Social
Security normal retirement age. Given the timing of our data, we did not take into account this Act to estimate
the model. As a result, simulations may underestimate the effect of the removal of the earnings test, since
individuals may have anticipated the Act. Note also that the loss in benefits due to the earnings test are paid
at a later age when earnings are below the cap. In our myopic model, though, individuals consider these benefit
reductions as pure losses.
10Note that the estimated effect of the abolition of the earnings test will be an overestimate of the true effect,
since our myopic model does not take into account that benefit losses due to the test are not pure income losses
in reality (see also Appendix A).
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Honig (1996) and Friedberg (2000) by means of reduced form models.
[Table 8 about here]
Our model also allows to analyze the impact of the social security reforms on the claiming
decision, which is reported in Table 9. Once again, the reforms’ impact is rather marginal. The
abolition of the spouse benefit implies that some women, who have a claiming husband, start
claiming after the reform. Easier to rationalize is the impact of the elimination of the earnings
test on the claiming decision. This reform implies a higher number of individuals (both men
and women) who start claiming benefits after the reform. Of course, this is due to the fact
that one can keep on working many hours without losing part of the social security benefits.
[Table 9 about here]
A final result worth mentioning is the comparison of the impact on hours worked for the
situation where the husband claimed, while the wife did not claim social security benefits.
This exercise’s results are shown in Table 10. In this particular situation, the abolition of the
spouse allowance is coupled with a higher labor supply of females. This can be explained by
the fact that women cannot rely any longer on their husband’s benefit in future, and that it
is thus worthwhile to increase their own future benefits by working more. The impact of the
elimination of the earnings test is similar, but somewhat more pronounced, to that obtained
for the whole sample. Once again, this is mainly due to the disincentive effects (especially for
men) associated with the earnings test.
[Table 10 about here]
6 Conclusion
We presented a structural model to study labor supply behavior of elderly households. Specific
to the model is that it is embedded in the collective approach to household behavior. By doing
this, we explicitly take into account that spouses may have different preferences over leisure and
consumption and that bargaining is involved to reach observed household allocations, which
are assumed to be Pareto efficient. Since preferences allow for general externalities with respect
to leisure, our model is able to deal with the widely observed coordinated retirement decisions
between spouses. We further do not only focus on the extensive margin (working versus being
retired), but also on the intensive margin (how many hours are worked). Moreover, also the
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claiming decision for social security benefits is incorporated in the model. Preferences and the
intrahousehold bargaining process are identified by making use of panel data with couples and
individuals who turned into widow(er)hood in the covered period, along with the assumption
that preferences do not change (except for possible health shocks), in such an event.
We applied our model to a sample of US households coming from the first five waves of the
Health and Retirement Study. Many of the model’s parameters were significantly estimated
and had implications that were according to intuition. Health effects are important. More-
over, they illustrate that health is multidimensional and that different measures of health all
have their place in a labor supply model. We further found strong dependence on past labor
supply behavior, which may point to habit formation or hours restrictions due to fixed costs
to participation. Important from the model’s point of view is that the spouses’ weights in the
intrahousehold allocation process significantly depend on their wages. This implies a rejection
of the standard unitary model, where household preferences are price-independent.
Finally, we conducted simulations of two widely discussed social security reforms by means
of our structural model. The first exercise consisted of the abolition of the spouse benefit. This
reform has almost no impact on spouses’ labor supply behavior, although there are indications
that there are disincentive effects associated with the spouse allowance. The second reform
concerned the abolition of the earnings test. It turned out that there is a small positive impact
on male labor supply, while the effect on women’s participation is rather unimportant.
All results taken as a whole, the tentative conclusion can be drawn that health effects
and state dependence are much more important to explain observed labor supply behavior
of the elderly, than social security features as the earnings test or the spouse allowance. As
a consequence, major increases in male and female participation rates seem only possible for
more sweeping social security reforms than the currently discussed ones.
A potential critique is that our model essentially implies that individuals in couples are
myopic; any future value from their actions is not considered in the household decision-making
process (apart from taking into account the implicit social security tax). A dynamic program-
ming approach would be feasible and we intend to follow that line in future research (see Rust et
al., 2001, Blau and Gilleskie, 2001, and van der Klaauw and Wolpin, 2003, for such attempts).
Indeed, this would allow dealing more accurately with forward-looking aspects concerning the
earnings test.
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Appendix A: Computation of net income
In order to compute Mit, full net income, we need to specify the tax schedule F (), as well as
the old-age security insurance function b(). In what follows, observed wages and income are
gross of any deductions or taxation.
Old Age Security Benefits (OASI)
First, we construct the Old-Age Social Insurance (OASI) benefits since these are taxable under
federal income tax.11 We use the Social Security Handbook (2003), as well as Coile and Gruber























In what follows we suppress the household index i. We denote an individual by j and his
spouse by −j. Denote age as ajt and therefore the birth year is defined by t − ajt . Old-Age
Security Insurance benefits of a couple will depend on the following elements:
1. Covered Earnings Base: The Average Indexed Monthly Earnings (AIME) of each
spouse aimejt ,
2. Progressive Adjustment: The Primary Insurance Amount (PIA) of each spouse, piajt ;
3. Actuarial Adjustment: The actuarial reduction factor (ARF), the delayed retirement
credit (DRC) and the cost-of-living adjustment (COLA) for the PIA computed at age
62.
4. Survivor and Spouse Benefits: The Spouse Allowance (SA) of each spouse, sajt , the
survivor benefit sujt if k
−j
it = 0 and the benefit cap on household total of each account
(HT) is applied.
5. Earnings Test: The Earning test on each spouse’s monthly benefit is applied to obtain
the total benefit of the household.
Covered Earnings Base (AIME)
The computation of a monthly benefit is based on past earnings. The average indexed monthly
wage is based on the contribution years of the employee. An employee’s contribution to the
social security fund is 7.3% which is matched by his employer. Most of it, 5.3%, goes to
financing OASI, with the residual part to disability insurance (0.9%) and Medicare (1.45%).
11We thank Nicole Maestas for allowing us to use her codes to calculate OASI benefits and for answering
our questions on the rules on numerous occasions. The program used was benchmarked against the ANYPIA
program from the Social Security Administration.
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All except Medicare contributions are levied on annual earnings up to $72,600 in 1999. In
the HRS 1992 data we observe the earnings history of individuals from to 1950 to 1991.12
Furthermore, we observe quarters where the individual was considered as covered (most sectors
of the economy are covered). These quarters of contribution are part of the eligibility criterion.
– Quarters of Coverage: An individual is qualified for OASI benefits based on his
birthyear. He is totally insured if he accumulated quarters of coverage qjt at least equal to the
number of years elapsed between the year where he turned 21 and the year when he turned 62
and first entitled to receive OASI benefits. For individuals born before 1929, this is computed
from 1950 to the year where they turn 62 so that they may have a smaller number of quarters




t ≥ mj)I(ajt ≥ 62). (12)
Since starting in 1994, we must update quarters of coverage based on employment in 1992,






We defined claiming as the first period where the individual is observed not working at or









This would capture most of the claiming decisions although it will miss those who delay
claiming and those who claim and continue to work.
–Computation Years: The number of computation years equals the number of calendar
years (complete) between first year of eligibility (62) and age where the individual turned 21
(1950 or later) minus five years. For most spouses retiring after 1991, this number that we
denote by cpj will be 35. For those born before 1929, the number of computation years are
further reduced by the number of years that fill the gap between their birthyear and 1929.
– Indexation: The amount earned (up to the yearly maximum (imposed on SSA files
but manually imposed from 1994 onwards) in any year t− s is indexed up to year t where we





I(ajt−s ≤ 60) + I(ajt−s > 60) (15)
where w
r:ajr=60
is the national average wage of the year r, two years prior to eligibility . If
the individual is older than 60 for the year where earnings are to be indexed, then there is no
indexation or earnings for those years (πjt−s = 1).
12Those who accepted to allow HRS to match their SSA records. About three quarters gave permission and
Haider and Solon (2000) find that the sample who does not give permission appears not to be different from
those who gave permission.
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Given a history of covered earnings
newjt−soajt−21
s=1
(including zeros for years where no con-
tributions were made), indexed earnings are defined as wjt−s = π
j
t−s ewjt−s for s = 1, ..., ajt − 21.














I(wjt−s ∈W jt )×wjt−s. (16)
Note that the aimejt does not depend on the date when one claims benefit.
The average monthly wage at t needs to be updated after a year, at t + 1 if this year’s
earnings wjth
j
t qualify in the new setW
j




t is greater than the minimal






. We update the AIME for 1994 to 2000 as
long as the individual does not claim benefit (tc ≥ t).
Progressive Adjustment (PIA)
The Primary Insurance amount (PIA) is deduced from the AIME by applying a progressive
piece-wise linear transformation. This calls for bendpoints where the inflections occur as well
as conversion rates on each segment.
– Bend Points: Bend points are increased each year depending on the average national
wage to reflect the similar indexation of the AIME. The base year for the bendpoint is 1979.
The two bendpoints were $180 and $1085 at that time. Denote those by bdmin,1979, bdmax,1979











Therefore there are bendpoints specific to each spouse.
– Conversion Rates: There are three conversion rates since there are two bend points.
These are 0.9, 0.32 and 0.15 and did not change over the period.
Once bendpoints are calculated for a spouse (which does not depend on claiming date but
on first-eligibility date), the PIA is given by
piajt = 0.9min(aime
j
t , bdjmin) (18)
+0.32min(max(aimejt − bdjmin, 0), bdjmax − bdjmin)
+0.15max(aimejt − bdjmax, 0).
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Changes in the PIA will result from changes in the AIME. The relation is non-linear if the
AIME crosses a bend point. A host of adjustments are imposed on this PIA depending on the
claiming date.
Actuarial Adjustments
The normal retirement age nraj is different for each individual and defined by the month and
year of birth of j. It progressively increases from 65 to 67 over the period as a result of the
1983 amendments the Social Security Law. Since we model the annual budget set, there are
only two normal retirement ages in the sample based on birthyear; 65 years old for individuals
born before or in 1942 and 66 years old after. There are no individuals for which the normal
retirement age is 67 in the sample.
If an eligible individual claims some year before age nraj, his monthly benefit calculated
from the PIA is reduced by a factor
arf jt = exp(−arjmax(nraj − ajt , 0)). (19)
where arj is a factor (0.687 for most individuals) which depends on the birthyear.
Similarly if a spouse claims after nraj then there is a delayed retirement credit given by
drcjt = exp(drjmax(a
j
t − nraj, 0)) (20)
where drj is the delayed retirement credit factor which depends on birthyear.
There is also a cost-of living adjustment which is a function of the claiming date and of
birthyear applied since the PIA bend points depended on virtual claiming age 62 instead of the
actual claiming date. We apply the colatj (cost-of-living adjustment for individual j at time t)
to any PIA after the claiming date.
Denote as rjt the combination of all reduction factors if one claims at t,
rjt = e
j
t × arf jt × drcjt . (21)
Once an individual claims in the data we let rjt = r
j
tc
. However, the colatj are applied to
the PIA after the claiming date.
Single and Couple and Survivor Monthly Benefit
We first compute monthly benefits of each spouse not considering that there exists a spouse




× colajt × piajt . (22)
Note that the piajt does not depend on the claiming date apart from the aime
j
t which is not
allowed to change once tjc ≤ t.
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Spouse Benefit For the spouse benefit, denote the spouse of j as −j. One is entitled for
spouse benefits if the spouse has claimed benefits (t−jc ≤ t). Furthermore, the retiree needs to
have a retiree benefit bsjt which is smaller than half the spouse’s PIA, pia
−j
t adjusted for one’s





















Note that the individual’s reduction factor and not that spouse’s reduction factor, is applied
to the spouse’s PIA. In the household only one spouse can benefit from the spouse benefit as is
clear from (23).13 Furthermore, note that the spouse benefit does not depend on the claiming
date of the other spouse itself but on whether he/she claimed or not.
Survivor Benefit Finally we have to consider the survivor benefit if one of the spouses dies
fully insured and the other spouse is over 62 years old.14 Then the survivor benefit is based on
a comparison of the PIA of both spouse where the DRC’s are applied to the deceased spouse’s




t . Define t
j
d to be
the date at which an individual died. The survivor benefit is therefore given by






− bsjt , 0). (24)
Since we do not model the children’s budget set, we do not take account of child survivor
benefit. Therefore, the survivor benefit is assumed to be only paid to the widow. On each
retirement account there is a limit to family benefits. The benefit drawn on one account
(bsjt + sb
−j
t ) cannot be in excess of 155-188% of the worker’s PIA (depending on birthyear)
(denote the rates hcj). Since the household cap will in most cases be binding, we need to
impose it on the total benefit of the household. However, we do not need to take account
of the survivor benefit since it is only paid to one person and therefore cannot exceed the







t − hcjpiajt > 0 (25)







t − exc−jt . (26)
Earnings Test
The earnings test is applied on the monthly benefit bejt differentially whether one is older or




t (only paid-work is counted
13We do not consider benefits allowed for divorced spouses and for other dependents in the household.
14Since we do not model disability insurance, we do not consider the possibility that a widow can collect
survivor benefit prior to age 62 if on social security disability.
15 In reality, benefit losses because of the earnings test are paid at a later age when earnings are observed
below the cap. In our myopic model, agents interpret this as a pure loss in income and do not consider that it
31
from employment or self-employment). The earnings test is based on an exemption amount
eajt which varies with t and with the nraj such that it depends on birthyear. If earnings are
above that threshold eajt , the benefits are taxed 50% if a
j
t < nraj and 33% above or at the
nraj . The tax rate function is therefore
taxjt = 0.50− 0.27I(ajt > nraj) (27)
Finally, the final old age insurance benefit of a spouse is given by
bjt = be
j
t − taxjt max(wjthjt − eajt , 0). (28)






In the budget set, we multiply this amount by 12 to get the annual income from benefits.
Federal Tax Schedule: US Tax Code
Primitive concepts
We describe a (very) simplified tax algorithm for a married couple with a joint return or for a
surviving spouse. Note that other amounts than the discussed ones are applicable to unmarried
singles or married individuals who file a separate return. Indices for observations and time are
suppressed in what follows.
We start from two primitive concepts:
• annual earned income: ei =Pj wjhj
• annual gross income: sum of all incomes from whatever source: gi = ei+ y.
Social security contribution
As indicated in the paper, employees contribute to social security via a charge on their earned
income. Note that there is a cap on the contribution for OASI and disability insurance; this is
not the case for Medicare. Therefore, we have:
• sscj = (0.053 + 0.009)×min ¡72600, wjhj¢+ 0.0145×wjhj ;
• ssc =Pj sscj .
is only deferred to a later age.
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Federal taxes
From gross income to taxable income Taxable income equals gross income minus de-
ductions. For simplification purposes, we will assume that individuals do not make use of
itemized deductions. Therefore, deductions consist of standard deductions and the deduction
for personal exemptions. We first have the standard deductions:
• basic standard deduction: $5000;
• additional standard deduction for age: each spouse is entitled to an additional deduction
of $600 if the spouse has attained age 65.
These deductions (starting from 1988) are subject to a cost-of-living adjustment. Then
there is the allowance of deduction for personal exemptions:
• exemption amount: $2000.
This exemption amount may be reduced if gross income exceeds the threshold amount
($150, 000). Again, the exemption amount is adjusted for cost-of-living.
Assuming that no adjustments are made for cost-of-living, then the whole operation results
in the following taxable income before application of the marginal tax rates schedule:





Marginal tax rates Married individuals who file joint returns and surviving spouses are
subject to the following schedule of marginal tax rates:
[Table 11 about here]
Denote this function by f and the amount of tax paid by f(ti). The absolute amounts in
this table are adjusted for inflation (starting from 1993).
Note that this scheme shows that one cannot apply the marginal tax rate on the whole
taxable income to calculate tax liability. Only for couples that have a taxable income of at
most $36, 900, the average and the marginal tax rates coincide.
Credit for the elderly
If individuals attain the age of 65, they are eligible to a credit for the elderly. The credit is
constructed as follows. First, there is an initial amount of $7500 if both spouses are eligible
(or $5000 if only one spouse is eligible). This amount is reduced conditional on some factors.
If gross income exceeds $10, 000, then the amount is reduced to one-half of the excess of the
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gross income over $10, 000. The final credit then equals 15% of the amount resulting from the
operation of reducing the initial amount. So we have the following credit if both spouses are
eligible:
cre = max[0, 0.15× {7500− 0.5 (gi− 10000)}]. (31)
Federal taxes to be paid
Let us denote federal taxes to be paid by fc. These are given by subtracting cre from f .
From gross to net
Finally, net income (denoted byMit) is obtained by taking into account all appropriate elements
(more specifically, gross income, social security contributions and federal taxes):
Mit = F () = giit − sscit − fcit.
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Table 1: Panel Composition and Main Caracteristics
Means/prop. reported alive in 2000 died 1992-2000
husband wife widower widow
age 60.8 56.9 63.1 62.44
Health
severe conditions ever 0.194 0.153 0.231 0.188
severe conditions since 0.074 0.056 0.100 0.061
mild conditions ever 0.548 0.538 0.553 0.638
mild conditions since 0.136 0.144 0.135 0.146
poor/very poor health 0.189 0.173 0.286 0.212
adls (at least one) 0.069 0.073 0.083 0.089
Labor market
working for pay 0.640 0.540 0.532 0.486
claimed OASI 0.305 0.160 0.440 0.253
hours worked (if >0) 41.3 33.6 36.68 34.61
imp. hourly wage 20.40 14.09 17.75 12.41
pension plan 0.427 0.265 0.323 0.229
pension annuity 1992 12156 4224 10212 4283
AIME 3058.8 939.9 2316.1 436.1
Couple preference
Pref. retire together 0.265 0.231 - -
Lenght of current mar. 31.42 - -
Total observations
1992 2495 - -
1994 2446 8 41
1996 2382 19 94
1998 2294 34 164
2000 2181 65 249
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Table 2: Social Security Claiming Decision
Age start claiming (as of 2000)
not yet 62 63 64 65 66+
Husband 45.77 33.15 5.89 3.77 7.58 3.56
Wife 62.16 27.66 4.65 1.48 2.65 1.2
Age husb. starts claiming (as of 2000)
Ret. yr dif. Total 62 63 64 65 66
-3 &less 46.88 52.8 55.7 45.6 25.4 22.2
-2 11.02 12.3 6.8 8.8 7.9 16.7
-1 12.85 12.9 11.4 11.8 14.9 11.1
0 15.67 11.9 18.2 17.7 25.4 27.8
1 5.88 4.2 2.3 5.9 11.4 5.6
2 2.94 1.5 2.3 7.4 6.1 8.3
3 & more 4.77 4.4 3.4 2.9 0.8 8.3
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
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Table 3: Hours Worked per Week and Claiming Decisions
wife (none claimed)
husb. 0 1-30 30-50 50+ Total
0 11.3 3.4 6.8 0.7 22.1
1-30 3.3 2.4 3.2 0.3 12.1
30-50 16.8 10.6 22.3 1.9 51.5
50 + 5.4 3.5 7.0 1.4 17.3
Total 36.8 19.9 39.2 4.2 65.8*
wife (wife claimed)
0 1-30 30-50 50+ Total
32.3 3.8 0.6 0 36.6
8.4 3.5 0.9 0.3 13.1
29.1 7.3 2.6 1.2 40.1
7.0 2.3 0.9 0 10.2
76.7 16.9 4.9 1.5 2.3*
wife (husb claimed)
husb. 0 1-30 30-50 50+ Total
0 42.0 10.2 17.4 1.7 71.3
1-30 7.4 4.7 5.9 0.3 18.3
30-50 3.4 1.7 3.1 0.2 8.5
50 + 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.1 1.9
Total 53.4 17.2 27.0 2.3 18.5*
wife (both claim)
0 1-30 30-50 50+ Total
62.5 7.6 1.9 0.1 72.2
14.1 3.1 0.9 0.3 18.4
4.8 1.9 1.1 0.1 7.9
1.1 0.3 0.3 0.1 1.7
82.5 12.9 4.1 0.6 12.8*
Note: Cells marked with an asterisk correspond to the percentages of observations in
each claiming configuration.
Table 4: Change in Hours Worked per Week and the Claiming Decision
(husb hrs) did not claim at t+1
did not cl. at t 0 1-30 30-50 50+
0 87.0 5.0 6.2 1.8
1-30 19.0 52.6 23.3 5.2
30-50 11.7 6.6 72.5 9.2
50 + 7.0 4.7 31.7 56.7
Total 26.5 9.9 47.2 16.5
(wife hrs) did not claim at t+1
0 1-30 30-50 50+
88.7 6.5 4.2 0.6
20.3 60.0 15.1 0.6
12.6 10.6 72.7 4.0
11.6 10.3 40.5 37.5
42.9 18.5 35.1 3.5
(husb hrs) claimed at t+1
did not cl. at t 0 1-30 30-50 50+
0 87.9 9.9 2.2 0
1-30 23.9 61.2 13.4 1.5
30-50 28.6 25.0 44.6 1.8
50 + 14.3 14.3 57.1 14.3
Total 67.7 20.7 11.0 0.8
(wife hrs) claimed at t+1
0 1-30 30-50 50+
93.8 5.5 0.7 0
37.5 54.2 4.2 4.2
30.8 19.2 42.3 7.7
33.3 33.3 0 33.3
81.0 13.4 4.3 1.4
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Table 5: Point Estimates of the Collective Retirement Model
husband wife
first order coefficients est. st.err. est. st.err.
own leisure βj
constant 0.670 3.195 -3.409** 0.788
age/10 -0.605 0.504 0.468** 0.129
severe health onset 0.661* 0.369 0.569** 0.227
mild health onset 0.489* 0.299 0.064 0.133
partner has adls (#) -0.283** 0.137 -0.164** 0.077
working part-time 3.055** 0.365 1.255** 0.123
not working 15.65** 1.263 7.782** 0.331
initial leisure/10 in 1992 1.023** 0.102 0.390** 0.037
initial leisure/10 of spouse -0.065 0.054 0.004 0.024
initial health status 0.435** 0.101 0.095** 0.047
partner leisure β−j
constant -2.196 1.949 -7.172** 1.406
age/10 -0.812** 0.297 0.706** 0.218
pref. retire together 0.419* 0.223 0.229** 0.089
lenght of marriage/10 0.070 0.098 0.056 0.042
consumption log(βc)
constant 6.398** 0.595 4.862** 0.334
age/10 -1.067** 0.104 -0.877** 0.062
severe health onset -4.112 8.496 0.111 0.203
mild health onset 0.040 0.283 -0.173 0.144
partner has adls -1.260* 0.824 -1.147** 0.449
initial health -0.100 0.081 -0.140** 0.042
second order βmf
log of partner leisure 2.683** 0.357 -0.308** 0.103
Weight µ
constant -0.849** 0.111
age difference/10 0.227** 0.044
wage (m) /10 0.089** 0.012
wage (f) /10 -0.009 0.009
capital income/10000 -0.239** 0.031
Aime (m)/1000 -0.033** 0.008
Aime(f)/1000 0.003 0.009
Log likelihood -2.021
Note: Coefficients with an (double) asterisk are significant at the 10 (5) percent
significance level.
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Table 6: Changes in Marginal Rate of Substitutions
quantiles
Effect on marginal rate of substitution 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9 0.95
Severe health onsets
$ of cons. per hour of husb. leisure 0 0 0 0 5.17 19.9
$ of cons. per hour of wife. leisure 0 0 0 0 0 51.4
ADLs of spouse
$ of cons. per hour of husb. leisure 0 0 0 0 146.8 22476
$ of cons. per hour of wife leisure 0 0 0 0 0 3660.1
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Table 7: Observed and Predicted Distribution for 2000
obs. hours per week wife
husband 0 1-30 30-50 50+ Total
0 35.85 6.74 7.29 0.45 50.33
1-30 7.74 3.53 3.30 0.36 14.93
30-50 10.91 5.50 9.72 0.73 26.86
50 + 3.07 1.33 2.84 0.59 7.83
Total 57.57 17.1 23.15 2.13 100
pre. hours per week wife
husband 0 1-30 30-50 50+ Total
0 33.12 10.56 4.70 2.39 50.77
1-30 13.07 4.76 2.57 1.51 21.91
30-50 7.69 3.25 2.04 1.49 14.47
50 + 5.86 2.82 2.11 2.02 12.91
Total 59.74 21.39 11.42 7.41 100
Chi-square (9) 433.49
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Table 8: Effects of Social Security Reforms on Hours worked
Abol. spouse ben. wife
husband 0 1-30 30-50 50+
0 -0.1 . 0.02 0.02
1-30 . . . .
30-50 . . . .
50 + . . . .
Abol. earnings test wife
husband 0 1-30 30-50 50+
0 -0.3 -0.05 . .
1-30 0.03 . . .
30-50 0.09 0.02 0.02 .
50 + 0.07 0.03 0.02 0.01
Note: Entries show the difference in relative frequencies (in percentage point) between
baseline (year 2000) and post reform situation. Cells with a dot contain a figure that
is too small to be mentioned.
Table 9: Effects of Social Security Reforms on Claiming Decision
Abol. spouse ben. wife
husband did not claim claimed
did not claim . .
claimed -0.07 0.07
Abol. earnings test. wife
husband did not claim claimed
did not claim —0.28 .
claimed 0.12 0.16
Note: Entries show the difference in relative frequencies (in percentage point) between
baseline (year 2000) and post reform situation. Cells with a dot contain a figure that
is too small to be mentioned.
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Table 10: Effects of Social Security Reforms on Hours worked (husband claimed/wife did not).
Abol. spouse ben. wife did not claim
husband claimed 0 1-30 30-50 50+
0 -0.18 0.03. 0.04 0.02
1-30 . 0.01 0.01 .
30-50 . . . .
50 + . . . .
Abol. earnings test wife did not claim
husband claimed 0 1-30 30-50 50+
0 -0.78 -0.025 -0.012 .
1-30 0.01 0.02 . .
30-50 0.3 0.12 0.07 .
50 + 0.3 0.12 0.08 0.07
Note: Entries show the difference in relative frequencies (in percentage point) between
baseline (year 2000) and post reform situation. Cells with a dot contain a figure that
is too small to be mentioned.
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Table 11: Marginal tax rates
Taxable income ti Lower bound Marginal rate
ti ≤ 36, 900 − 15%
36900 < ti ≤ 89, 150 5535 28%
89150 < ti ≤ 140, 000 20165 31%
140000 < ti ≤ 250, 000 35928.5 36%

















































































































































































Figure 2: Budget set for a couple with a 62 years old husband
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